Abstract-Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, including intelligent agents, are becoming increasingly complex. Explainable AI (XAI) is the capability of these systems to explain their behaviour, in a for humans understandable manner. Cognitive agents, a type of intelligent agents, typically explain their actions with their beliefs and desires. However, humans also take into account their own and other's emotions in their explanations, and humans explain their emotions. We refer to using emotions in XAI as Emotion-aware eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (EXAI). Although EXAI should also include awareness of the other's emotions, in this work we focus on how the simulation of emotions in cognitive agents can help them self-explain their behaviour. We argue that emotions simulated based on cognitive appraisal theory enable (1) the explanation of these emotions, (2) using them as a heuristic to identify important beliefs and desires for the explanation, and (3) the use of emotion words in the explanations themselves.
Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are becoming increasingly complex. Understanding the decisions made by AI systems is facilitated by enabling them to explain their decisions. Explaining behaviours in applications like simulations and games for training is therefore deemed essential [7] . EXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is developed to explain decisions made by AI systems [4, 7, 34, 36] .
A cognitive agent is a type of AI system. Cognitive agents choose their actions based on their beliefs, desires, and intentions. Previous work on XAI explains the agent's actions based on its beliefs and desires [3, 14] and sometimes also uses ontologies containing information about the environment [34] . However, beliefs and desires are insufficient to explain many human actions, as emotions are often required when communicating the intentions behind such actions [11] . Humans use emotions to communicate, e.g., our intentions ('I quickly crossed the street because I was scared of the angry looking man'), and pleasure vs. displeasure ('I was distracted because I was sad)' [17] . Explaining someone's actions often requires reasoning over their emotions [27] , and emotions make actions more intelligible because they explain underlying values of a human individual [33] . In everyday communication between humans, describing each other's behaviours in terms of beliefs, desires and emotions is sometimes referred to as folk psychology. One assumes the intentional stance [9] , i.e., one assumes the agent performs actions based on its intentions. We argue that XAI should also take emotions into account.
Cognitive agents can simulate emotions by implementing a computational model of emotion [8, 10, 13, 26] . Here, we propose that such emotions can improve XAI in several ways. First, there are often many beliefs and desires preceding the decisions of a cognitive agent. Simulated agent emotions can serve as a heuristic to find the most important beliefs and desires to be communicated when explaining the motivation behind an action. Second, emotions can be used to formulate the explanations in a more natural (human like) manner. For example, 'I gave you additional homework because I was scared you might otherwise fail the test'. Third, human-agent interaction can benefit from the ability to explain simulated emotions based on the underlying appraisal process. Just like humans that sometimes need to explain their emotions to be understandable during communication, such agents can benefit from explaining their emotions as well. We discuss these three uses of emotion in XAI.
Background and Motivation
People explain their behaviour to find meaning and to manage interactions [25] . When explaining actions from the intentional stance, one assumes that the action was a result of the intentions of the agent [9] . One then uses folk psychology to construct explanations [6, 9, 24] .
Churchland [6] divides folk psychology in two classes: 1) fully intentional concepts like beliefs and desires; and 2) quasi-intentional concepts like, e.g., emotions, hunger and pain. He mentions that these quasi-intentional concepts regularly support simple explanations, of a more causal character (e.g., I was trembling because I was scared).
Malle [24, 25] calls fully intentional concepts reasons, and identifies a third type of reasons (besides beliefs and desires), which he calls valuings. In his own words: 'Valuings directly indicate the positive or negative affect towards the action or its outcome' [25] . Examples of valuings are: like, enjoy, fear, or thrilling (one might recognize these as emotions, moods, and attitudes). Valuings are not beliefs (one can not have a false valuing), nor are they desires (desires are always directed at unachieved states, valuings can also be directed at already achieved states, e.g., one can value having a roof over ones head). Valuings combine features of both beliefs and desires, but can be subsumed under neither [25] .
978-1-5386-0680-3/17/$31.00 c 2017 IEEE Döring [11] states that beliefs and desires are often unsatisfying when explaining an action; emotions are required. She divides actions in two subtypes, expressive actions (e.g., kicking a chair at home because you are angry about something that happened at work) and rational actions (e.g., crossing the street to get to the other side).
Expressive actions often require emotions for satisfactory explanations. Kicking the chair is intelligible by explaining you were angry. However, rational actions can also require emotions to satisfactory explain (rationalize) the action [11] . For example, quickly crossing the street can be explained by mentioning that you were scared of a dangerous looking person that was staring at you.
When provided in a social setting, emotions and motivations increase the acceptance of human action explanations [20] . They make actions more intelligible because they explain underlying values of the agent [33] . Humans use emotions to communicate intentions [17] , which makes emotions a part of folk psychology [6] .
Despite the importance of using emotions for human action explanation, there is to our knowledge currently no work on this in eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). We propose to research how to apply the concept of emotions to XAI, and we discuss 3 different uses of emotion in Emotionaware eXplainable Artificial Intelligence.
Related Work
In many AI applications users require insight into the motivations behind a system's decisions [16, 22] . In scenario-based training (e.g. disaster or military training) the agents in the training should be able to explain the rationale for their actions so that students can understand why the training unfolds as it does [7] . In tutor and pedagogical systems, natural dialog between the user and system has been shown to increase the training effect of such systems [12] . Debugging tools for BDI agent programs might benefit from a natural way of interaction involving asking why agents perform certain actions instead of looking at execution traces and internal mental states [2] . In gaming and interactive storytelling [5, 35] , having mechanisms to generate explanations of agent actions (the "story") could enhance the flexibility and appeal of the storyline.
XAI systems often use question lists, allowing the user a limited set of questions to ask [7, 34] . Such a question list then contains different types of questions. Simpler questions that require short factual answers, but also more nuanced questions that aim to find underlying motives of an AI system's decisions. Another approach focusses on the generation of explanations from beliefs and desires [4, 15] . One should then take special care in designing the reasoning of the agent [14] . If a good design is in place, then the XAI system can automatically choose the best explanation, based on the structure of the agent design, and characteristics of the user [14, 18] . This work is similar to the work presented here because it focusses on cognitive agents, and uses a folk psychology based approach for explaining the agent's behaviour. However, in the present work we consider agents that simulate their emotions, and propose to use these simulated emotions when constructing the explanations.
Enabling cognitive agents to self-explain their behaviour by emotions is not the same as defining how emotions influence their decision making. For example, [8] formalizes the link between appraisal, coping, and behaviour. However, explaining agent-actions by emotions introduces an additional complexity. One should not provide the user with the full decision process of the agent, because this might overflow the user and thereby render the explanation useless [20] . So, explanation of emotions or the use of emotions in explanations is related to the simulation of the interplay between emotion and cognition, but not the same.
Using Emotions to Enhance Explainable AI
We discuss three different uses of emotion in XAI for cognitive agents: First, simulated emotions can be used as a heuristic to find appropriate content for the explanation ('I ran away because there was a man holding a gun'); Second, simulated emotions can be content in the explanation ('I ran away because I was afraid that I might be killed'); Three, the agent can explain why it has the emotion using the underlying appraisal process ('I was scared because there was a man holding a gun, and guns can kill someone.').
Although we acknowledge that EXAI should also include awareness of the other's emotions, in this work we first focus on the simulation of emotions in cognitive agents to help the construction of explanations provided by these agents.
Emotions as Heuristic
A fundamental problem in XAI for cognitive agents is that there can be many propositions that a cognitive agent reasons about (i.e., has beliefs, desires, and/or emotions about). Many of those reasons are relevant for the agent's decision to perform the action. It is not trivial to construct a concise action explanation based on the agent's reasons. Previous work has focussed on finding beliefs and desires relevant for the explanation, and achieve this by putting constraints on how the agent's decision making is implemented [4, 14] . As an alternative, we propose to use the agent's simulated emotions as a heuristic to find the content for the explanation. Computational models of emotion generally evaluate (appraise) the agent's beliefs and desires when computing the agent's emotions [10, 13, 19, 29] , we propose an approach that uses this appraisal to determine the content for the explanation. For example, simulated emotions can tell us that if doing an action made us happy about achieving some desire, then we can explain doing the action with that desire. Heuristics like this one, where simulated emotions are used to determine the content of the explanation, are for the remainder of the paper referred to as emotion heuristics.
We can define an emotion heuristic, based on the appraisal of desirability, to find the desires for a desire-based explanation. For example, emotions can be positive (e.g., joy, hope, relief), or negative (e.g., sadness, fear, disappointment). Emotions further have an intensity and are directed Figure 1 . In this figure the agent has three desires: g1, g2, and g3. It simulates its hope of achieving these desires before and after performing action a. Since desire g1 has the largest increase of hope, the agent uses this desire to explain why it performed the action.
at objects/ events that we find (un)desirable [30, 31] . When we simulate the agent's hope of achieving its desires, before and after some action, then we can compute the increase of the agent's hope of achieving these desires. This gives a single value, for every individual desire. One possible emotion heuristic is to explain the action with the desire for which this value increased the most (see Figure 1) .
We can also use emotions to choose the most appropriate type of reason (belief, desire, emotion), to cite in the actionexplanation. For example, there is empirical evidence suggesting that humans tend to choose a desire-based explanation over a belief-based explanation when having performed socially undesirable events [25] (However, this requires verification). Emotions that fit such situations are feeling 'guilt', or 'shame' for your action [28] . If the computational model of emotion used by our agent simulates such emotions, then we can use this to generate our explanation.
Emotion-Based Explanations
A cognitive agent should be able to use its simulated emotions in the formulation of its explanations. Citing only beliefs and desires in action-explanations is often insufficient, emotions can be required for constructing a satisfiable explanation [11] . Emotions and motivations increase the acceptance of explanations [20] . Providing good explanations increases a user's trust in and understanding of the system they are working with [21, 23] . This is especially important for cognitive agents since these are designed to operate semi-autonomously, and often operate in consequential domains like medicine, or military operations [16] .
Emotions can make explanations more concise. When explaining one should be careful not to overflow the receiver of the explanation with too much information [20] . People do not need much information for a satisfiable explanation [14, 20] . Emotions can be used as a summary of beliefs and desires (e.g., 'I am happy about X' would suggest believing X is true and desiring X to be true [30] ).
Using emotions, rather then only beliefs and desires, can make explanations more concise, natural and satisfiable. For example, a cognitive agent might provide the user with the following (combined) explanation: 'I proposed to play a quiz because I wanted to test you on your geographical knowledge (desire), and hoped we would enjoy playing a game together (emotions)'. It is difficult to formulate the 'hope of enjoying a game together' using solely beliefs and desires, whilst maintaining a concise, natural, and satisfiable explanation.
Explaining Emotions
An increasing amount of cognitive agents is simulating emotions using computational models of emotion like EMA [13] , and FAtiMA [10] . In addition to using the appraisal process to generate the emotion, we argue that it is possible to use these frameworks and the appraisal process they simulate to explain the emotion of the agent to the user. This is the third application we envision for emotions and XAI. Here, we aim to explain the emotion itself, rather than use the emotion for action-explanation. The emotion theories underlying the computational models of emotion can be used as inspiration for constructing explanations of the emotion. For example, the OCC model [28] explains happiness as appraising an event as desirable. The belief desire theory of emotions (BDTE) [30] explains being 'happy about X' as, 'I wanted X and thought X was the case'.
Such appraisal processes can be used to construct an explanation of the emotion. Depending on the computational model, different explanations can be generated. This can even be used to evaluate the plausibility of such computational models, an important issue in this field [1] .
Formal Use Case and Implementation
We present a formal use case of an agent that simulates beliefs, desires, and emotions. We show how the simulation of emotions helps to find proper explanations. The use-case is implemented in our prototype of an EXAI framework. First, we present semantics of an agent's mental state, and how it is updated. Second, we introduce the context of our use cases, i.e., the PAL-project. Finally, we use the semantics to show an example in our context domain. Our aim with this is not to work out how EXAI should work eventually, but rather to show its plausibility and usefulness.
Agent's Mental State
The agent's mental state consists of a belief, desire and emotion base. The belief and desire bases are sets of propositions, mapped to a value [ 1] , where θ ∈ Θ is an emotion label (e.g., hope, happy, or fear), and I maps proposition ϕ ∈ P and label θ ∈ Θ to an intensity value between [0, 1]. We denote θ(ϕ, i) ∈ Υ as 'the agent has emotion θ (directed at proposition ϕ) with intensity i'. For example, the agent can hope that Jimmy has sufficient knowledge of hypo's.
Definition 1. (Mental State)
A mental state is a triple Σ, Γ, Υ where Σ is called a belief base, Γ is a desire base, and Υ is an emotion base.
The agent can update the mental state based on events. An event is external (caused by another agent, or the environment), or internal (actions performed by the agent itself). We define a run of an agent to be a sequence of mental states and corresponding events. For the sake of conciseness we do not consider here how the agent exactly updates its mental state, but leave this to the agent program itself. Here it is enough to know that every consecutive mental state is a result of the previous mental state updated by an event. 
Definition 2. (Agent Run) An agent run is a sequence of mental states (m i ) and events (u
i ), [m 0 , u 1 , m 1 , u 2 ,
Context: A Personal Assistant for a Healthy Lifestyle
Our use case is inspired by the PAL (a Personal Assistant for a healthy Lifestyle) project. Here, we help children (aged [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] to cope with diabetes mellitus type 1. We develop an agent that interacts with the children, their parents, and their caregivers, to assist them with the treatment process.
In this complex AI system it is vital that the users understand and trust the system. For example, if the application keeps asking questions about hypo's to the child, then it should be able to explain its underlying motivations. E.g., the system might explain that its aim is to educate the child, and it beliefs that playing a quiz about hypo's is currently the best way to do so; or, the system might say it hopes that the child will increase its knowledge on hypo's by answering quiz questions about hypo's. We are developing an XAI module capable of generating such explanations.
Use Case
Given an Agent Run, we can explain actions by using the simulated emotions. In this use case, a child ('Jimmy') is playing the quiz. At the end of the quiz the PAL-agent opens educational material about hypo's. Jimmy would like to know more about why PAL does We first show how to construct a belief-and a desirebased explanation using simulated emotions as a heuristic, and show how to construct an emotion-based explanation afterwards. For the sake of conciseness we will only show mental states: m 0 , m 5 , and m 6 , i.e., the mental state before playing the quiz, and those before and after the agent-action.
In this example the agent has three desires and three beliefs about propositions [ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ϕ 3 ] ( Table 1 shows a short description of these propositions). Furthermore, the agent simulates emotions based on CAAF [19] , which is again based on BDTE [30, 31] . However, any other computational model of emotions could have been used. As long as the model shows, for every emotion simulated based on the agent's progress on its desires, which desires exactly caused the agent to simulate the emotion (i.e., the model should show which desires caused the agent to simulate, e.g., hope).
The example shows a couple of informative emotions. At first, the agent was happy to think Jimmy had obtained sufficient knowledge about hypo's. During the quiz, the agent learned that this was not the case (events u 2 and u 4 ). After the agent's action the agent became hopeful that Jimmy might now actually have obtained sufficient knowledge by reading the educational material. Note further that the desire d(ϕ 2 , 1) has disappeared from the mental state. This is because it had already been achieved. However the valuing happy(ϕ 2 , 1) lingers a bit longer (until the computational model of emotion decides it has decayed over time [19] ). This resembles the description of Malle [24, 25] that desires are always directed at unachieved states, while valuings can also be directed at already achieved states.
Emotion Heuristics.
We define a heuristic based on emotions to find a proposition (about which the agent can have a belief, desire or emotion) to use as content for an agent-action explanation. This heuristic considers the emotions in regards to the agent's desires before and after the agent's action. For every emotion it determines whether an emotion is part of the set positive emotions (θ + ∈ [happy, hope, relief ]) or negative emotions (θ − ∈ [unhappy, f ear, disappointment]). If the emotion is positive then it computes the increase in intensity; otherwise, it computes the decrease in intensity. This gives a single value per proposition in the agent's mental state, we call that value the affective gain of a proposition. The proposition with the highest affective gain can be used in the explanation.
Definition 3. (Affective Gain A)
Given two consecutive mental state and emotion bases Υ t−1 ∈ m t−1 , and
The affective gain that an agent has on some proposition given two consecutive mental states is computed as follows:
The difference between Υ 5 and Υ 6 is that the agent obtained hope and fear about proposition ϕ 1 . This is a result of how emotions are computed in CAAF [19] . If the agent is uncertain about the achievement of a desire, then it simulates hope (of having achieved the desire) and fear (of not having achieved the desire). Other computational models of emotion might disagree on these type of computations; however, for our purposes of computing an affective gain we need not concern ourselves with this. The proposition with the highest affective gain can be used for the explanation (A(ϕ 1 , 6) = 0.4, A(ϕ 2 , 6) = 0, A(ϕ 3 , 6) = 0, i.e., ϕ 1 can be used). If the user asks why the agent did u 6 , i.e., 'PAL-agent opened the educational material', then the agent can explain the action by using its beliefs, desires, and/or emotions about the proposition ϕ 1 (e.g., I want to teach you sufficient knowledge about hypo's).
Emotion-based explanation.
Besides a belief or desire based explanation concerning ϕ 1 , the agent can also use the simulated emotions about ϕ 1 to construct emotionbased explanations. For example, I was unhappy about ϕ 1 . Or I hoped to achieve ϕ 1 . An emotion-based explanation is constructed by using emotions about the proposition obtained from the affective gain formula. Either negative emotions before the action, or positive emotions after the action can be used for the explanation. 
Future research should determine what emotions are best to use in the explanation. This can depend on context information like, e.g., type of user. Definition 4 shows an example technique to find emotions that can be used in the explanation. In the example, unhappy(ϕ 1 , 1) and hope(ϕ 1 , 1) can be used, i.e., 'I was unhappy to learn that I had not thought you enough knowledge about hypo's'; or, 'I hoped that providing you this educational material would teach you sufficient knowledge about hypo's'.
Explaining emotions.
Cognitive appraisal theories like BDTE [30, 31] , OCC [28] , or the Sequential Checking Theory (SCT) [32] consider what mental states human agents have when experiencing certain emotions. For example, BDTE explains being unhappy as believing something is false, while desiring it to be true (or the other way around). If we use that to explain the agent's unhappiness in m 6 then we can use the belief and desire about the proposition the emotion is directed at, i.e., 'I came to belief that you do not yet have sufficient knowledge about hypo's (while I do want you to)'. In OCC we explain unhappiness as focussing on a past event that was undesirable. We might then cite the event that caused us to simulate this unhappiness. If we look at the Agent Run then we can find the event that preceded the agent's emotion. For example, the agent's unhappiness about ϕ 1 was elicited in mental state m 2 , following event u 2 . One approach for explaining the agent's unhappiness is by citing the event that preceded it, i.e., 'I was unhappy about Jimmy's knowledge of hypo's after perceiving that Jimmy answered question (id:32, topic: Hypo's) wrong'.
Discussion and Future Work
In this paper we proposed three different uses of simulated emotions in eXplainable AI (XAI). First, using the simulated emotions to find appropriate content for the explanation; Second, using the simulated emotions themselves in the formulation of the explanation; Three, explaining the emotion using the underlying appraisal process. For the design of cognitive agents that simulate emotions, it is important that they consider the role of emotion in selfexplanations of their behaviour.
We showed an example of an agent that simulates emotions based on the CAAF framework [19] . The agent updated its beliefs, desires, and emotions based on events perceived in the environment. Choosing content for explanations is a challenging problem in XAI. We showed that the agents can use emotion heuristics (for example, the affective gain technique) to find content (beliefs and desires) for the explanation. The simulation of emotions further enabled to also use the emotions as content for the action explanations, while previous work was limited to using only beliefs and desires. Finally, we gave an example of how one can explain the simulated emotions themselves. Clearly, the techniques shown in the use case were not intended to be workedout models. Rather we aimed to show the plausibility and usefulness of using the simulation of emotions in XAI.
Future work includes measuring the usefulness of emotion-based explanations in cognitive agents (i.e., when should one provide an emotion-based explanation instead of, or in addition to a belief, or desire based explanation); and, what are the communicative effects of using different explanation styles (e.g., do emotion-based explanations make the agent sound more human like, or emotional).
In conclusion, we have argued that emotions have a strong potential to enhance XAI. Emotions are essential for human action-explanations [11] and we identified three different ways in which emotions can be used to enhance XAI for cognitive agents. As explanations have been argued to be important for the understandability of artificial agents' actions, and emotions are used by humans in the construction of action explanations, we believe our proposal has great potential to further enhance this understandability as well as make artificial explanations more human-like.
